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Summary: Commentators have raised important points, including the relative contribution of false beliefs versus false memories
and the issue of how ﬁndings in the laboratory can be generalized to the real world, which we have addressed here. However, some
of the commentaries misrepresent what we said, make criticisms that are unfounded, or imply that our article should not have been
published in Applied Cognitive Psychology. We relate these responses to a more general literature on the suppression of unwanted
scientiﬁc ﬁndings and suggest that the study of false memory would be better served by more openness to alternative perspectives.
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As experts who act both for the prosecution and defence in
cases where adults’ memories of childhood are at issue, we
had been struck by the imprecise and sometimes misleading
ways in which the literature on suggesting false childhood
memories in the laboratory was often presented, both in the
scientiﬁc literature and in court. It had been 21 years since
the ﬁrst experimental studies were published, yet no one in
the ﬁeld had produced a systematic review of this large and
important body of research. We were surprised to ﬁnd,
however, when we previously submitted an almost identical
version of our review to other scientiﬁc journals, that some
of the referees’ reports were exceptionally hostile. One of
these referees, who has contributed to a commentary in the
current issue, wrote, ‘So, more than 40 hours and eleven
pages later, how should I sum up my review? This manu-
script is basically a biased rant dressed up in pseudoscientiﬁc
clothes… Their most crucial claims…are spectacularly
inaccurate…this manuscript is not, and probably could not
ever be, worthy of publication in a peer-reviewed journal’.
Another referee recommended rejection, commenting, ‘The
authors appear to have some sort of political or social agenda
that may be contributing to their dismissal or minimizing of
the false memory ﬁndings’.
Readers can now judge for themselves how accurately
these comments describe our paper. The current set of
commentaries include many thoughtful and constructive
responses, and we address some of the most important of
these ﬁrst. We believe that it is necessary to raise the issue
of the suppression of scientiﬁc debate, however, because
other commentaries, though they largely avoid the ad
hominem attacks we received earlier, demonstrate other
familiar rhetorical devices that are frequently employed to
try to discredit scientiﬁc ﬁndings. We identify these in the
second half of this commentary.
ISSUES FOR THE FIELD
Commentators have paid a huge amount of attention to our
summary ﬁgure of 15%, representing the average number
of participants who appeared to develop full false memories
in implantation experiments. There are many potential ways
to summarize the data, and we believe that it is healthy to
debate this. In our paper, we attempted to show how investi-
gators have tried to rate the complex subjective judgements
by which participants decide if their mental experiences are
more like beliefs or memories and whether apparent
recollections are likely to correspond to a real event. The
distinctions we used appear very similar to those articulated
by Scoboria and Mazzoni (2016); although, as they note,
because studies have not adopted a common framework,
the links between concepts and measures used are sometimes
approximate. Several commentaries noted an as yet unpub-
lished ‘mega-analysis’, based on eight memory implantation
studies. Three of these studies appeared in the column
corresponding to ‘full false memory’ and ﬁve in the column
corresponding to ‘false memories partially meeting full
criteria’ in table 4 of our review. Based on re-rating the
original memory transcripts, Scoboria et al. (2016)
concluded that 11% of the false memories were ‘substantial’
(their most conservative category) and a further 9% were
‘complete’ (their next most conservative category). It is
striking that despite the methodologies being entirely
different, the prevalence of 15% we estimated based on our
most conservative category falls midway between estimates
based on Scoboria et al.’s two most conservative categories.
This convergence greatly strengthens conﬁdence in the
conclusions of ourselves and Scoboria et al. (2016). The
way both sets of authors operationalized their concepts has
the merit of being explicit, so that the effect of different
assumptions can be tested. The important point, it seems to
us, is that in a therapeutic or courtroom context, it is of the
utmost importance to be aware of the range of possible sub-
jective states, rather than using a generic label of ‘false
memories’ to cover widely differing experiences. The data
show clearly that more stringent deﬁnitions of what
constitutes a false memory lead to lower rates.
Some commentators (Lindsay & Hyman, 2016) have
objected to our reference at one point to 15% as an ‘upper
bound’, pointing out that rates will ﬂuctuate under different
conditions. It is true that investigator-determined rates of
what we have deﬁned as full false memories were as high
as 25–26% in a couple of studies. Our estimate factors in
concerns about the ﬁle drawer problem (Becker-Blease &
Freyd, 2016; Pezdek & Blandon-Gitlin, 2016), evidence we
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identiﬁed that investigator ratings probably overestimate
false memory rates relative to participant self-ratings, and
the likelihood that some events assumed false by investiga-
tors could in fact be true. Ultimately, this is a matter of
judgement. However, we cannot agree that ‘depending on
the criteria one uses, full false memory creation can range
from 15% up to 46%’ (Otgaar, Merckelbach, Jelicic, &
Smeets, 2016). Given that the higher ﬁgures they mention
are based on some experiences that participants do not be-
lieve correspond to an actual memory, we struggle to under-
stand how this range can possibly provide ‘a more reliable
estimate of the potential to implant full false memories for
entire events than the lower bound percentage’.
A point made by Scoboria and Mazzoni (2016) is that in
our focus on full false memories, we have underestimated
the signiﬁcance of false beliefs. As noted by Pezdek and
Blandon-Gitlin (2016), we agree that we have largely
followed the ﬁeld in concentrating on the implantation of full
false memories as this has the greatest relevance for situa-
tions where therapists may create memories of childhood
trauma. A few of the false feedback studies we review do
show some behavioural effects of inducing false beliefs, al-
though these are largely conﬁned to small increases or de-
creases in the selection or consumption of certain foods.
Nevertheless, we agree with Scoboria and Mazzoni that in-
creasing a false belief of having been abused in childhood
is equally reprehensible and could have damaging conse-
quences to the individual and others. Smeets, Merckelbach,
Jelicic, and Otgaar (2016) further suggest that a false belief
might be sufﬁcient to start a legal proceeding. It would be
valuable to be able to go beyond the largely anecdotal evi-
dence available at this point. However, we agree that on oc-
casion, it might certainly be enough to start an investigation
and could have very negative consequences, even though its
chances of going to court are most likely very slim.
The issue raised by most commentators concerns how to
generalize the results of these experimental studies to the real
world. As McNally (2016) correctly notes, this is not at all
straightforward. He discusses conditions likely to increase
false memories occurring among patients in therapy, includ-
ing a belief in the existence of repressed memories, a belief
that they can cause symptoms, and a belief in the power of
techniques suggested to retrieve them, as well as certain
cognitive styles. In our article, we discussed which aspects
of therapy might be comparable to processes examined in
the experimental studies and might have damaging conse-
quences, as well as ways in which therapy differs from these
studies. It is notable, however, that several of the commenta-
tors assume that the experimental techniques are weak
versions of what may happen in the real world (Lindsay &
Hyman, 2016; Nash, Wade, Garry, Loftus, & Ost, 2016;
Smeets et al., 2016), involve ‘minor and rapid manipulations’
(Scoboria & Mazzoni, 2016), or express astonishment that
they result in any false memories at all (Nash et al., 2016).
This opinion that the memory implantation studies involve
weak manipulations and must therefore underestimate real-
world dangers is worth considering in more detail. Other
false memory experts (Hyman & Pentland, 1996), in con-
trast, have thought that the studies involved very high levels
of demand on college student participants. One factor that
has not been brought out clearly is that the experimental
studies involve deliberate deception from trusted and author-
itative family members often accompanied by other speciﬁc
and seemingly incontrovertible corroborative evidence. In
our view, deception involving family witnesses and doctored
photos for unremembered events is not a trivial or mild inter-
vention. It is an integral part of all implantation studies and
goes beyond the therapeutic analogues of strong suggestion
and pressure to remember apparent in all false memory
paradigms. It is unclear to us why it should ever have been
considered as an analogue of what goes on in the therapist’s
ofﬁce.
Given the weak effects of suggestion obtained in the other
paradigms where strong deception is not used, we suspect
that it is the powerful combination of deception and
pressured suggestion that is the main driver of false memo-
ries in the laboratory. Moreover, deception is likely to be re-
lated to false beliefs and acceptance that are often included in
investigator-based assessments. Although therapists may re-
peatedly suggest that events such as childhood abuse have
happened, they are never in this position of being able to
conﬁrm events because they themselves were there. As a
result, participants in the experimental studies may be more
inclined to imagine the suggested events, and in some cases,
to develop full false memories.
The same ambiguity surrounds anecdotal claims about
what happens in therapy and the assumption that memories
are recovered because of inappropriate therapeutic practice
(Nash et al., 2016; Smeets et al., 2016). In many cases, it ap-
pears that memories of abuse are recovered prior to therapy
or in the absence of suggestive techniques (Andrews et al.,
1995; Andrews et al., 1999). But among therapists,
knowledge of how memory works is far from perfect, partic-
ularly for those who are not qualiﬁed as psychologists
(Brewin & Andrews, 2014), and this lack of awareness can
have very damaging consequences. In cases we have
reviewed, we have seen examples both of inappropriate prac-
tice leading to highly dubious patterns of recall and to a
much more spontaneous and limited type of memory recov-
ery. We do not believe that at this point, it is reasonable to
make any claims about whether the rate of false memories
is likely to be higher in the laboratory than the clinic or vice
versa. What we would like to see in the future is a more
nuanced appreciation of these issues and for experts to desist
from making misleading claims about the relevance of the
laboratory to the real world.
SUPPRESSION OF ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES
Here, we identify some examples of rhetorical or misleading
attempts to discredit our ﬁndings and conclusions, similar to
those we have encountered during the review process.
Pejorative language
Our message (that experts should be wary when informing
the courts about this literature) was described by Smeets
et al. (2016) as ‘naïve’. Nash et al. (2016) refer to our paper
as ‘a ﬂawed opinion piece masquerading as a peer reviewed
article’ and suggest that it ‘ignores the facts (about memory
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fallibility) so blithely that it seems more suited to being
called an op-ed piece than a peer-reviewed “research
article”’. This is intriguing, considering that it is being pub-
lished alongside commentaries from many of the leading
experts in the area. It is striking that none of these commen-
tators appear to have discovered ﬂaws in the comprehensive-
ness of our search strategies or in the extraction of and
summaries of the data. A number of them appear to agree
with our conclusions, and some even suggest that they have
expressed similar opinions to ours in earlier publications
(Lindsay & Hyman, 2016).
Misrepresentation
A commonly used tactic in trying to suppress alternative
opinions is to criticize the authors for writing something that
is clearly fallacious or ill-considered even though they did
not in fact do this. Some of the most egregious examples
of this tactic are described here. Lindsay and Hyman
(2016) claimed repeatedly that we attempted to establish an
upper limit on the probability that adults who were not
abused as children can be led to believe that they were,
which clearly could never be inferred from the experimental
evidence. Our conclusions made no reference to this real-
world scenario: ‘From our review of (memory implantation)
studies… the upper bound would seem to be about 15% of
participants’. Nash et al. (2016) claimed that we drew con-
clusions about the fallibility of memory in general, not just
about suggesting memory for childhood events, which en-
abled them to criticize us for not including other kinds of ev-
idence. But our review is explicitly focussed on false
childhood memories and at no point seeks to draw wider
conclusions; for example, we state that ‘it cannot be con-
cluded that false memories of childhood events possessing
these characteristics are common, that they are easy to sug-
gest or implant or that the majority of individuals are sus-
ceptible to them’. Another misrepresentation was that we
downplayed the potential inﬂuence of therapists, suggested
by Lindsay and Hyman (2016), Smeets et al. (2016),
Scoboria and Mazzoni (2016), and Nash et al. (2016). On
this issue, we invite readers to look at our conclusions and
reassure themselves that we have considered the role of
therapists in a detailed and balanced way. In addition, we
were accused of making out that the importance of false
memories had been exaggerated. For example, Nash et al.
claimed that we imply that ‘scientists are making a moun-
tain out of a molehill’. Our actual words expressed the very
opposite opinion: ‘The fact that susceptibility to false
memories appears to be lower than has often previously
been suggested does not diminish in any way the signiﬁcant
implications (of this literature) for the courtroom and the
need to consider the extremely damaging consequences that
might ensue’. Finally, Scoboria and Mazzoni (2016)
complained that we imply that people are not inﬂuenced
by imagination inﬂation procedures, when we clearly stated
that ‘the data indicate fairly conclusively that on average
the imagination paradigm increases participants’ beliefs
that events, originally perceived as unlikely to have
happened, are more likely to have occurred than they ﬁrst
estimated’.
The ‘straw man’ argument
This is the criticism that we identiﬁed mistaken views about
the literature that nobody in fact holds. Lindsay and Hyman
(2016) point out that some memory researchers have
previously articulated the arguments that we ‘appear to be
offering as novelties’. We agree, but for us to be setting
up a ‘straw man’ requires that these insights have become
generally accepted and part of the way researchers discuss
the results in this ﬁeld. If this was the case, then it is not
clear why our article attracted such hostile responses.
Although some of the commentaries do broadly accept
our conclusions, others—particularly those by Nash et al.
(2016), Otgaar et al. (2016), and Smeets et al. (2016)—do
not appear to accept any of them as valid. Lindsay and
Hyman ask, ‘Who could dispute that use of the term “false
memory” without qualiﬁcation or explanation has the
potential to be misleading?’ As we note below, however,
the commentary by Otgaar et al. (2016) provides a classic
example of the dangers of using the term ‘false memory’
to include numerous quite different phenomena.
Flaws in our methods
The main criticism, made in only one of the commentaries, is
that our choice of literature was selective and that we omitted
important material Otgaar et al. (2016). But, as these authors
themselves admit, none of the studies they mention actually
involved memory for childhood events, which was the sub-
ject of our review. If the charge is that we omitted irrelevant
material, then we will have to plead guilty. Citing misinfor-
mation studies for nonautobiographical events, Otgaar et al.
(2016) argue that the high conﬁdence found in these ‘im-
planted false memories’ contradicts our conclusions, thus il-
lustrating how use of the term ‘false memory’ can be
narrowed or broadened to suit a particular rhetorical purpose
(Becker-Blease & Freyd, 2016). Of course, as Lindsay and
Hyman (2016) rightly note in their commentary, ‘It is easier
to engender false reports of trivial details in an inconsequen-
tial event than to create false reports of signiﬁcant life expe-
riences’. Finally, Otgaar et al. also criticize us for including
literature on their crashing memory paradigm which does
not involve childhood events. Readers will note that we cited
this study in an introductory section and that it did not ﬁgure
in our data tables.
Flaws in our description of study results
Lindsay and Hyman (2016) argue that we overstate our case
by saying, ‘even when clear memories were identiﬁed by the
investigators, participants’ conﬁdence in them was below the
scale midpoint’. They say that this is true in a number of
studies but not all, citing Lindsay et al (2004) as showing
that ‘self-ratings of conﬁdence, reliving and remembering
for the suggested event…were equivalent to and in some
cases directionally greater than their ratings for true
events…’. This is misleading on two counts. First, in
Lindsay et al. (2004), the only rating of a suggested event
that was higher than the midpoint was a measure of autobio-
graphical belief (belief the event happened), not the
conﬁdence in memory to which we referred. Second, what
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they are comparing here are ratings for the subset of partici-
pants who had memories of the suggested event versus
equivalent ratings for true events in the entire sample,
whether they could remember the events or not. Like-for-like
comparisons show a clear advantage in favour of true mem-
ories. Lindsay and Hyman also cite Hyman and Pentland
(1996) as showing that self-report ratings of false memory
image clarity and conﬁdence were equivalent to ratings of
recovered true memories (our italics). Readers should note
that over 75% of true memories were always remembered,
and study ratings of conﬁdence in memory and imagery clar-
ity for these, averaged across conditions, were consistently
higher than for false events.
Scoboria and Mazzoni (2016) accept that some memorial
reports judged to be recollections by observers may not be
based on true recollections but assert that what we do not
consider is that some events that are subjectively experi-
enced as recollected may not be perceived by observers as
such. Citing Otgaar and colleagues (Otgaar, Scoboria, &
Smeets, 2013), they state, ‘the issue of miscommunication
about the subjective basis of memory reports runs in both di-
rections’, and therefore our observation ‘cannot solely be
used to reduce estimates of memory formation rates’. How-
ever, an analysis of the ﬁgures in table 1 of Otgaar et al.
(2013) shows that in 41% of instances where observers rated
a memory for the suggested event, the participants them-
selves did not report such a memory. When observers rated
no memory for the event, only 9% of participants disagreed,
a large difference signiﬁcant by McNemar’s test (p< .01).
This clearly suggests that rating discrepancies between re-
searchers and participants are a reason to reduce estimates
of memory formation.
Scoboria and Mazzoni (2016) also suggest that we could
have made more of the inﬂuence of moderator variables
and included estimates of the size of effects for factors that
are associated with higher likelihoods of false belief and
false recollection. The only one they suggest is event
plausibility, which is already well-established (Pezdek &
Blandon-Gitlin, 2016). We have discussed in the paper
why we did not think that the data lent themselves to
meta-analysis; the small number of relevant studies poses
additional problems for moderator analyses, which are not
recommended in the absence of sufﬁcient statistical power
(Hedges & Pigott, 2004).
CONCLUSIONS
Why do we not content ourselves with pointing out the errors
and misrepresentations in the commentaries but additionally
suggest that they amount to an attempt to suppress scientiﬁc
debate? Partly, this is because of the discrepancy between
the extreme hostility of some of the original reviews and
the questioning of our motives, coupled with the absence
of any coherent scientiﬁc critique. It is notable that the objec-
tions appear to be more about the implications of the data
than the data themselves. Whereas we have attempted to give
a balanced perspective on how the data may be relevant to
therapists’ activities, our critics appear only to be concerned
with the consequence that therapist-induced false memories
might be perceived as less common or less important than
what was previously thought. In reality, there are other sig-
niﬁcant dangers; for example, that exaggerating the role of
false memories might lead to the accounts of genuine abuse
survivors being wrongly dismissed. It is not ‘naïve’ (Smeets
et al., 2016) to be able to consider multiple perspectives. One
consequence of the narrow focus to date is that alternative
scenarios such as perpetrator-induced alterations in recall
of childhood experiences have been almost entirely
neglected (Becker-Blease & Freyd, 2016).
The clearest indication that there has been an attempt to
suppress our data is contained in the ﬁnal section of the com-
mentary by Nash et al. (2016), in which they all but state that
our article should not have been published because it did not
go through a conventional peer review process with Applied
Cognitive Psychology. We believe that this and the other
hostile responses we have received are part of a more general
pattern that can be discerned across a number of controver-
sial areas of science. It is recognized that theoretical rigidity
and lack of open dialogue are a particular problem for theo-
ries that are rooted in public policy or social morality advo-
cacy goals. As Ferguson (2015) notes (p. 532), ‘This occurs
when scholars become emotionally invested in a theoretical
perspective. Inconclusive data may be interpreted as support-
ive of the theory and nonsupportive data ignored, criticized,
or suppressed’. Likewise, partisans assume that their own
views of the world are objective and infer that subjectivity
(e.g. due to personal ideology) is the most likely explanation
for their opponents’ conﬂicting perceptions (Keltner &
Robinson, 1996). Empirical evidence supports the fact that
reviewers’ evaluations are biased by whether the study’s re-
sults favour their own theoretical position (Mahoney, 1977).
In order to avoid the possibility that data which contradict
reviewers’ assumptions are suppressed, it has been recom-
mended that all articles and reviews be published, separating
the review process from the publication decision. Our
experience suggests that in some controversial areas, this
approach is necessary and that journal editors often fail to
challenge or correct a ﬂawed review process. We therefore ap-
plaud the editors of Applied Cognitive Psychology for mak-
ing our data and arguments available and encouraging a wider
debate. The views of Nosek and Bar-Anan (2012) appear to
be particularly relevant to the study of false memories: ‘Truth
emerges as a consequence of public scrutiny—some ideas sur-
vive, others die. Thus, science makes progress through the
open, free exchange of ideas and evidence’ (p. 217).
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